

Parmenides

4. No plurality

- Parmenides does not seem to give any argument against plurality, but scholars have held him to be a monist, i.e., who believes that reality is one and that there cannot be a plurality of things.

Parmenides

- If there were more than one thing then there would have to be something distinguishing or at least separating them otherwise they would not be two things.
- But then what separates one from the other? Is there a space between them? No, that can't be, for there is no empty space. Is there then no space between them? Then they run together, and are one, not two.

Parmenides

- So what could separate them?
- A space between them? Nope. There's no empty space. If there's no space between them, then they would seem to run together and be one, not two.

Parmenides

- If there were two things, (say) Snookie and Pookie, it would be true to say that one of them **is not** the other, i.e., that Snookie is not Pookie. But then we are “saying what is not,” and we all know that is impossible to do!

Parmenides

- Parmenides may think that the world simply has no movement or qualitative change. On this view he would hold that there cannot be any qualitative **difference** or difference of any kind.

Parmenides

- Suppose there is a difference between a and b . That means there must be some property, F , such that a is F and b is not F . But when you say that b is not F you are violating Parmenides' rules because you are saying that *the F -ness of b* does not exist.